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The phenomenon of death is an issue which was very 
frequent in philosophy. However, almost all reflections 
on this subject were usually from the anthropocentric 
perspective. In the cognitive horizon, for example, the 
issue of the essence of death was investigated, human 
helplessness was discussed in its face, models of 
existential attitude towards inevitability were 
constructed. This anthropocentric attitude changed 
only in the second half of the twentieth century in the 
result of the ecological crisis. From then on, in the 
philosophical debate, not only is discussed the death of 
a man but also death in the sense of total annihilation 
of life on Earth. According to the concept of global 
death, the passing ceases to be accidental. It loses 
connotations close to the metaphor of further life. It 
also ceases to be identical with the cosmic 
metamorphosis. Instead, it becomes a synonym of evil, 
which delivers the final blow to everything that lives 
in the biosphere. In this vision, one can grasp death 
cognitively and oppose its physical abandonment. 
Man, regarding global death, can remain a causative 
agent. One of the philosophical versions of stopping 
the invasion of death was proposed by Hans Jonas. He 
called his strategy the ethics of responsibility. Fear 
heuristics, new axiology and the ideal of human 
attitudes play a key role in it.  
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Death as a synonym of the irreversible 
destruction of life has always intrigued the most 
outstanding minds. Also today it occupies the 
attention of thinkers, writers, poets, composers, 
artists, doctors. From the prevalence of interest in 
this issue, the philosophy of death emerged in the 
second half of the last century. Within its framework 
research is carried out on many levels. The axis of 
the anthropological aspect are the investigations 
aimed at explaining the mystery of the human 
phenomenon from the perspective of finitude. The 
limits of the ethical dimension of death define the 
moral dilemmas associated with making a decision 
on how to end life at its different stages. Aesthetic 
threads focus on attempts to establish the criteria of 
the beauty of death and its ugliness. In the cognitive 
area, in turn, one looks for sources of human 
confidence about one’s own mortality and formulate 
definitions of death. In-depth studies in this field 
prove that regardless of the orbit of exploration, it is 
saturated with the spirit of anthropocentrism.  
Death, meanwhile, is not a phenomenon 
concerning humans only. It occurs everywhere 
where there are living organisms and shows itself in 
all sorts of ways. Narrowing the discourse to the 
anthropocentric horizon is almost a matter of generic 
selfishness. Therefore, favoring such an attitude 
requires a reorientation of thinking and developing a 
new language for it. Ergo, it is reasonable to venture 
beyond the circle of anthropocentrism and look at 
death through the prism of global annihilation.  
The view of the progressive annihilation of 
the biosphere allows to state that of all the global 
threats the greatest one is the risk of complete 
disappearance of life on Earth. Expert reports are the 
argument justifying the inferred assumption. They 
clearly show that the progressing degradation of the 
biosphere eliminates the functioning of mechanisms 
that maintain equilibrium in nature, interferes with 
biochemical cycles, and reduces the biodiversity of 
the environment. It will become the main cause of 
disasters with an all-encompassing range. In relation 
to human being, it results in deterioration of the 
biological quality of life, causes numerous 
civilization diseases and contributes to the increase 
of mortality. In turn, in the political and social 
dimension, it results, inter alia, in the contradiction 
of economic interests and in military conflicts 
caused by the desire to take control over the 
distribution of natural resources [1].  From this point 
of view, death is no longer merely an accidental fact, 
which falls on an individual suddenly and in a blink 
of an eye deprives it of all possibilities, intentions, 
and hopes, or the end of an individual being encoded 
in its structure and gradually realizing itself [2]. Nor 
does it have to be associated with the metaphor of 
life or the cosmic metamorphosis. The global 
dimension of death includes associations related to 
devastating evil, which is a real force gradually 
conquering life. The onslaught of devastating evil 
breaks down life from itself and gives it the final 
blow. The externalization of devastation is turning 
the reality of every life form into nothingness. This 
death, unlike others, is not a mysterious event of 
unknown extraction.  To some extent, it can be 
captured cognitively. It is also not difficult to 
indicate the source of its origin. The cradle of global 
death is the moment of violation of the state of 
homeostasis between man and the natural 
environment.   
In view of this concept of death, a man is 
not completely helpless and can oppose it because in 
the continuum of devastation he remains a causative 
subject. One of the philosophical versions of actively 
facing the devastating evil on the global scale was 
proposed by Hans Jonas. The work in which Jonas 
laid out his views is The Imperative of 
Responsibility. The framework of this discourse, 
however, does not allow a summary of the entire 
treatise. It is enough for the purpose of exposing the 
general meaning of the Imperative to recall a few 
basic categories of thought and a polemic with 
traditional ethics. Jonas claims that current ethics, 
whether in the form of direct recommendations or 
setting rules for these guidelines, was 
anthropocentrically inclined. All dealing with non-
human world remained ethically neutral. Actions on 
non-human things were not within the sphere of 
ethical matters [3]. Only the direct relation of man to 
man, including his reference to himself, had ethical 
validity. In previous ethics, good and evil were close 
to human action.  
This proximity of ends – persuades Jonas – 
pertained to time as well as space. The effective 
range of action was small, the time span of foresight, 
goal-setting, and accountability was short, control of 
circumstances limited. Proper conduct had its 
immediate criteria and almost immediate 
consummation. The long run of consequences 
beyond was left to chance, fate, or providence. 
Ethics accordingly was of here and now, of 
occasions as they arise between men, of the 
recurrent, typical situations of private and public 
life. The good man was the one who met these 
contingencies with virtue and wisdom, cultivating 
these powers in himself, and for the rest resigning 
himself to the unknown [3]. 
According to the type of time perspective 
and the spatial horizons of old ethics, ethical maxims 
were formed. All of them, regardless of the content 
differentiation, are characterized by a narrowing to 
the immediate and present circumstances of the 
activity. He sees this restriction even in the 
commandment of love and categorical imperatives 
of I. Kant. Without going into a detailed assessment 
of the legitimacy of Jonas's opinion on the narrow 
nature of these maxims, it is worth pointing out that 
Jonas's view can be accused of one-sidedness, whose  
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task is to confirm the rightness of the assumptions 
made by them. After all, neither in the new 
commandment nor in the content of categorical 
imperatives, there is no way to love our neighbor 
today, or to treat another person as an end in itself 
twice a year, and not necessarily on the remaining 
days. 
 After revoking the validity of the old 
maxims, Jonas introduces new ones in their place. 
From now on, the action should take place under the 
dictate of imperatives in the stronger and weaker 
version. In a stronger variant, the order takes the 
form of: „Act only in such aw that the effects of your 
actions can agree with the continuity of authentic 
life”. The milder variant is expressed in the sentence: 
„Act only in such a way that the effects of your 
actions are not destructive to the possibility of such 
a life in future” [3]. Jonas’s imperatives clearly 
prohibit putting at risk the life on Earth in general. 
The current generation has no right to endanger 
future ones and destroy the biosphere because of the 
desire to improve its present conditions. In Jonas's 
opinion, the approval of the imperatives he defined 
will be synonymous with overcoming the 
anthropocentrism of traditional ethics and the chance 
for the ethics of tomorrow, the quintessence of which 
is far-reaching responsibility.  
The author of the Imperative singles out two 
types of responsibility. One is of formal nature [3]. 
Usually, it is a moral and civil law responsibility. In 
the second edition, it is called “positive”. This kind 
of responsibility does not apply to hold a man 
accountable for something ex post facto but is 
intertwined with what is yet to be done in the future 
[4]. In such an optic, someone feels responsible not 
for their conduct and its consequences, but for a 
matter that brings certain claims against him [3]. 
If I understand Jonas's somewhat intricate 
thought structure correctly, then he is concerned with 
responsibility not so much in the sense of feeling 
guilty because of some evil, but more about feeling 
capable of custody over the well-being of a human-
dependent good [5]. Responsibility for good Jonas 
derives from the feelings such as concern, dread, 
fear, kindness, compassion, interest, concern for 
existence in every existing form. This group of 
feelings is a part of the heuristics of fear [3]. The text 
of the Imperative gives grounds for concluding that 
in the heuristic of fear, in addition to the idea of the 
threat of existence of all that is weak, the primary 
ability of man to quickly perceive evil and the nature 
of evil also play a significant role [3]. According to 
Jonas, malum is an invasive, overbearing and 
imposing element. Evil is usually direct and 
obtrusive. It reckons with no one and nothing. Its 
ruthlessness attracts the attention of the man and 
entangles him in itself. When malum comes our way, 
says Jonas, then we know what we are dealing with 
[3].  
 
Bonum, on the other hand, is far from being 
ostentatious with its charm. It is characterized by 
discreet beauty, subtlety, gentle harmony. The 
attractiveness of good does not bother anyone. It is 
generally hidden in the shadow and remains 
unnoticed. According to Jonas, until an individual 
can distinguish between good and evil, and is not 
afraid of it, he will not know what he really should 
protect and why he should do it. We know the thing 
at stake  – Jonas writes – only when we know that it 
is at stake [3].   
Knowing evil is, therefore, a prerequisite 
for doing good. In fear heuristics, this requirement 
seems to be the aftermath of Socratic ethical 
intellectualism. According to Socrates, knowledge is 
good and includes not only knowledge of this or that, 
but also the ability to make important distinctions 
and take appropriate actions. No one who follows 
this attitude chooses anything that would not be good 
for him. The doctrine of the Athenian master thus 
conceals the assumption that it is impossible to 
disconnect what is good for a given man, from what 
is good in general [6]. The Socratic note that 
resounds in the hermeneutics of fear gives it a 
normative meaning. It is summed up in two moral 
maxims of duty.  
The first one recommends visualizing the 
effects of evil. A man's duty is to take the intellectual 
toil and effort of the imagination to indicate evil. The 
work of thoughts and the hardships of the 
imagination are supposed to instill in people the fear 
of evil, which has not yet happened and perhaps does 
not have an analogy in the past or present experience. 
The creatively imagined malum – Jonas writes – has 
to take over the role of the experienced malum [3]. 
In order for the imagined evil to become a part of the 
feeling, it is necessary to present it intentionally. It 
cannot be a derivative of a coincidence.  
The second rule, on the other hand, requires 
the induction of a feeling, proportional with the self-
evident evil. The emergence of a proper emotion 
towards this malignity is also not a creation of blind 
luck. Just as the conceived malum, it is to be induced 
intentionally. From the psychological point of view, 
an accurate explanation of the genesis of this 
emotion towards for evil is not an easy matter as it 
was in the case of Thomas Hobbes, who made the 
starting point of the ethical considerations not love 
for summum bonum, but fear of summum malum [7]. 
In order to make the contrast between the concept of 
fear in Hobbes's approach and the theory of Jonas, it 
is worth mentioning that the British thinker had in 
mind mainly the fear of a man of his own death. In 
Elementorum Philosophiae Hobbes wrote that this is 
the evil that most people know well. The possibility 
of experiencing it is always present in them, and the 
threat is real. This fear comes from the innate instinct 
of self-preservation [7].  
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Thus, it is not absurd or reprehensible, 
contrary to sound reason, if someone puts all his 
efforts to protect his body and its members from 
death and suffering and to preserve its existence. 
And what does not contradict healthy reason is that 
everyone considers it right and lawful [8]. 
Jonas, in turn, in his fear doctrine places the 
emphasis differently and makes it clear that the fear 
he is concerned with has nothing to do with the 
involuntary predisposition. It derives primarily from 
the conscious attitude of man. This attitude must be 
cultivated in order to develop emotional readiness to 
foster concern by the very thought of the tragedy of 
future generations. Forming an open attitude focused 
on fueling fear only in the face of alleged and distant 
expectations related to the fate of life on earth is a 
new kind of éducation sentimentale and at the same 
time an obligation of ethics. Guided by Jonas’s logic, 
a man is obliged to be opened and aware, 
proportionally to the strength of anxiety aroused.  
A careful view of fear heuristics shows the 
rank of the subjective factor in the ethics of 
responsibility. The philosopher partly shares the 
well-known view of voluntarists’ saying that ethics 
can lead a person to act, but only if he first moves his 
will, not reason. It is in the bosom of emotion that 
the question of taking responsibility is resolved. 
According to Jonas, the emotion is the motor force 
that drives the will. However, this is not tantamount 
to completely marginalizing the functions of reason. 
Reason completes the will and cooperates with it.  
In the opinion of some researchers, the 
heuristic of fear is to lead to the belief that man is 
able to prevent evil and has the choice between two 
mutually exclusive possibilities [9]. Either he will 
speak for doing evil or for giving it up. One does not 
need much insight to understand that this preference 
of action cannot be realized in the axiological 
vacuum. It must be oriented towards a certain 
universe of values and gravitate towards it. The 
privileged place is occupied by ideal patterns of a 
statesman and a parent [3]. A lot of publications 
have already been written about the effects of the 
first paradigm, so one can feel free from the 
obligation to discuss it. Somewhat different looks the 
case of the parent’s pattern. In this case, it is 
necessary to comment it briefly. As it results from 
The Imperative,  the reasoning of Jonas, focused on 
the parent's paradigm, aims to visualize his strength 
of being, total power of attorney and a number of 
obligations towards a helpless child. 
The radical dependence of the born child as 
such carries with it a mandate towards the parents 
to reverse its re-immersion in nothingness and care 
for its becoming. The commitment to this was in the 
act of birth. Its fulfillment (even by others) becomes 
an inalienable duty to being, existing now under its 
own authentic law and in complete dependence on 
this fulfillment [3].   
 
Quoting this statement in extenso allows 
avoiding simplifications in the interpretation of 
Jonas’s parent pattern and its moral aspect. 
Important in it is the belief in the unique situation of 
the child, which appeals for care and unconditional 
vigilance over his fate. An adequate response of the 
parent to the child's appeal is to show it a total 
concern that optimally protects his or her existence 
exposed to harm and sometimes even to 
extermination [10].  
Under the concept of total care, Jonas seems 
to understand the overall care of the child. The 
parent's total care takes into account not only the 
elementary needs of the child in the early phase of its 
ontogenesis but also cares for upbringing, education, 
stimulating development and the ability to exercise 
control over it. Holistic care also involves providing 
the child with conditions for self-realization and, if 
possible, achieving happiness. Such care should 
bring out the potential inherent in it and make it the 
best being possible [3].   
According to Jonas, the development of the 
child's optimum potential cannot be done without 
maintaining a continuity of care. Care must not be 
interrupted at any time or forgotten. Care for a child 
must be continuous because its life continues each 
time puts new demands on parents. That is why 
Jonas acknowledged the permanence of care as a 
constitutive attribute of responsibility. The 
continuity is maintained over time and only in it is 
possible to build the child's historical identity [3]. 
In the parent's paradigm, Jonas distin-
guishes two temporal horizons of responsibility. The 
first is linked with the child's present. In this area, the 
parent here and now creates the "history" of the child 
and works to deepen its identity. The second horizon 
mainly concerns its future. The parent, in a way, 
thinks ahead not to let the child reduce or take 
something from his or her existence. On the contrary, 
the parent steps ahead of the child in order to secure 
the foundations of a moral attitude towards the 
phenomenon of life on the globe in general. To this 
prospective aspect of responsibility, Jonas 
acknowledged the attribute of the guardian of being. 
The parent, as the guardian of being, looks after the 
emergence of humanity. At the same time, it protects 
mankind from actions that have destructive 
consequences for its future [3]. Parental 
responsibility, therefore, appears in Jonas's research 




In the course of the reflection of the eminent 
paradigm of ethics of responsibility, it is easy to 
come to the conclusion that we have to do with one 
of the most interesting proposals of attitude towards 
the spectrum of global death. The concept is not only  
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a philosophical manifesto but also a call for 
involvement. It is a call to transform your own and 
collective way of being in the world. The call of the 
philosopher is clearly heard especially in the verbs 
that dynamize his statement. They include: the 
awakening of anxiety, bringing about an emotional 
attitude, perceiving, wanting, caring, etc. Jonas's 
vision is also saturated with good energy and exudes 
a desire for change. an innovative understanding of 
the duty to prevent global death and the obligation to 
promote attitudes aimed at protecting existence in all 
its forms gains recognition.  
These aspects undoubtedly constitute a 
strong asset to Jonas’s concept. However, they 
cannot cover the weaker sides of the parent's 
paradigm. A careful reading of The Imperative 
reveals, for example, the lack of any mention of the 
diversity of this figure in terms of gender. It is not 
known whether there is a mother or father under the 
"parent" category. It would seem that the 
philosopher refers the aforementioned term to both 
parents. Meanwhile, as it is known, the mother's 
responsibility has different shades than the color of 
the father's responsibility. The parent's paradigm for 
bonding with own child also raises doubts. After all, 
with such an assumption, the pattern is 
understandable only in the situation of biological 
parents. It does not have to be clear for social parents 
or guardians who are not connected to children with 
blood ties. The story also clearly showed that even 
biological parents who love their offspring turned 
out to be degenerate torturers for other children [11].  
Moreover, many parents commit 
wickedness not by accident or because of weakness 
On the contrary, they make it out of the cool 
calculation and reject any moral scruples on the path 
to violence. It is not on the side of the helpless child 
that evil is lurking, but in the parent, certain of his 
reasons. Contrary to Jonas, the parent's archetype is 
not so unambiguously positive. The assumption that 
only the ethical premises are in a perfect                  
parent pattern is very doubtful. In light of the above, 
it is difficult to raise this paradigm to the rank of a  
universal norm and an absolute point of reference for 
the ethics of responsibility.  
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